Information Security Defense in Depth Part 2 – A Bit More Technical View

Still for foundation level folks but a bit more technical view of Defense in Depth than last week’s post.

 

 

Critical Manufacturing Cyber Security Defense Program – A Starting Look

Cyber security professionals  are often tasked with trying to defend more than they have the resources to defend. This is especially true in the area of Critical Manufacturing as there tends to be a strong desire to protect everything.  In many cases when we try to protect everything we end up protecting nothing.  A Cyber Security Defense Program (CSDP) needs to be very focused and strategically deployed to protect the systems and areas which need protected.

Critical Manufacturing as defined by the Department of Homeland Security(DHS) is primary metal, machinery, medical, electrical and transportation.   Primary metal is Iron, Steel, Aluminum non-Feros metals;  medical includes facilities and devices, machinery is engines, turbines and power transmission, within electrical is electrical equipment manufacturing, transportation is :  vehicle, aviation and aerospace parts and vehicle manufacturing and railroad rolling stock.   Products made by these are essential to critical infrastructure sectors. The Critical Manufacturing sector focuses identification, assessment, prioritization and protection of nationally significant manufacturing industries within the given sector that may be susceptible to manmade or natural disasters.  This area is one that is critically in need of a strong CSDP.   The discipline for CSDP must not be twisted to taint what should be a strategic approach to the industrial base (“Critical Capabilities At Risk,” 2009).

One critical component to the protection of a Critical Manufacturing environment is that of using next generation, aka smart, firewalls with intrusion prevention and with some form  of malware  prevention and detection, updated via global feeds, enabled. This firewall environment should be set up in such a way as to segment the Critical Manufacturing infrastructure. Each individual plant or factory within the Critical Manufacturing environment should be on their own local area network (LAN) segment. A very basic way of thinking about this is captured in Figure 1 below.

Manufacturing Network Segmentation

Figure 1

Because of the method in which business decisions are made for factory systems it is critical that organizations involved in Critical Manufacturing use strongly firewalled network segmentation methods to ensure that each of their factory sites sit behind their own firewalls and on their own network segment (DHS, 2009).  This allows better control of the environment and enables the isolation of one factory without impacting the rest of the factories owned by the organization.  In this way if one factory is compromised by a hacker or group of hackers it can be removed and isolated from the organization’s global IT infrastructure.  Network segmentation, also called Network Control (NC) is a primary bastion for a defense in depth strategy and it can also be used to help prevent a blackhat from pivoting from a relatively unsecure factory system to a core business system.  Combining an Intrusion Prevention Appliance (IPS) or functionality with the firewall inside of a network segment provides a strong front line of perimeter defense for factories involved in Critical Manufacturing.  These IPS’ do not have to be overly tweaked and analyzed to be effective, running them in default signature mode is an adequate layer of defense for the network segment protecting and controlling a factory environment (DHS, 2009).

Cyber Security – A basic look at Defense in Depth

A basic somewhat quirky and fun look at Defense in Depth.

 

A Note I Wrote to Someone Who Once Worked for Me

I recently had the honor to help provide a strong reference for a person who worked for me as a Cyber Analyst.  She got the Senior position she was going for but was just a little worried about what they should do in order to lead a team and be a good leader.  Here is what I related to this extremely competent future Cybersecurity leader.

Hi:

First and foremost – you are going to do great in your new role. I encourage you to model your leadership style after the following rule(s):

Use the leadership model of:
Am I doing the right thing
Am I doing it for the right reason
Am I doing it at the right time
Am I doing it in the right way

This is on the back of the Challenge Coin I had made up for our UC team.

Always act with Integrity and walk your talk. You don’t always need to be right but you always need to be honest with the people you lead.

Remember that “We are smarter than Me” and foster healthy discussion and debate on topics. Try to pull ideas and suggestions from those you lead who are more on the quiet side. Don’t let aggressive Type A personalities (like me) dominate the conversation.

When coming out of a meeting get your team members used to doing a 5 minute feedback session (what did we do right, wrong, what should we (or I) have done differently, etc. Remember – Feedback is a gift.

Training of your people needs to be a priority and always remember to help others be Greater Than Yourself. There is enough success out there for everyone, help grow your people so that they can be your boss some day and if that did happen they would be a good boss to work for.

Don’t hesitate to email if you have specific questions. Have confidence, breath deep and believe in yourself – you got this!

Home Depot Breach 43M loss posting on LinkedIn

I just read an article on LinkedIn about the negative impact caused by the recent Home Depot breach. Here are my thoughts about how all the 2014 breaches should change some C level and Information Security paradigms. These could cause a major C suite thought shift and maybe even a large paradigm thought shift in how our profession thinks about the skills and talents really needed by Information Security professionals.

Note – I know this opinion will not resonate well with some CISO’s – Major IT departments continue to hire CISO’s that have little to no security background. Hackers and blackhats are associated with organized crime and IMO until we put more of an emphasis on the word SECURITY in the CISO title and until CISOs stop walking a tightrope by always trying to compromise and keep the business happy by letting the business need trump the security need (“ok, don’t patch that extremely vulnerable system I understand your business need not to” ) the crooks will continue to win.

Also, it appears that too many companies are basing their CISO hiring decisions on the candidate’s business acumen. Wouldn’t it be better to focus on how well the candidate knows how to fight and deter criminals?
I’m not saying CISO’s don’t need to understand the business I am saying that a stronger focus should be on how much the CISO knows about criminals and crime fighting. I also realize that thought would take a major paradigm shift in the thinking of the C suite.

The Insider Threat is Alive and Well – a summary taken directly from Raytheon’s How to Build an Insider Threat Program (2014) …

Aspects of human nature further complicate matters: Well-intended managers resist any notions of “their people” doing “bad things.” They screened them. They hired them. They work with them side-by-side and – if they’re good bosses – have developed a genuine interest in their career development and even personal happiness. In addition, one of the most critical elements in building a high performing team is trust, so anything thaWhite Hatt can have a negative impact on that trust needs to be very carefully analyzed and explained before being implemented.  This disposition is not about being gullible, we all have white hat syndrome at times. It’s about being a helpful manager – and a decent person.

But it would be imprudent to completely abandon a sense of cautionary oversight, as there has been a steady flow of news reports about insiders doing harm to their organizations. They range from probably the most notorious of incidents – Edward Snowden’s carefully plotted leaking of sensitive NSA documents after downloading 1.7 million files – to possibly the funniest (except for the company in question): A software developer for a U.S. critical-infrastructure company literally outsourced his job by sending his log-in credentials to a Chinese contractor, so he could get paid six figures to surf Reddit, post Facebook updates, shop on eBay and watch cat videos all day2.  While the latter anecdote has generated considerable amusement, it underscores the reality that internal threats pose serious risks: 53% of organizations have experienced an insider cybercrime incident, according to the 2013 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey from the CERT Insider Threat Center at the Carnegie Mellon University.  So who are the users who pose threats? In all cases, they have authorized access to the network and their co-workers and managers are usually shocked that they would do such a thing.  Clearly, tech departments need the support of their leadership to do what plant managers and foremen did in the 1950s: Watch. Audit. Intervene. Prevent.

Regardless of the user’s full time or contractual status, you want to look for classic “tip-off” behaviors which can lead to trouble, e.g. the clear taking of proprietary information NinjaHackerwithout need or approval; expressing increased interest in matters unrelated to defined duties; and connecting to the network remotely from unusual places at unusual times, having access to machines that they really don’t need access to, constantly seeking for elevated privileges, to list a few examples from the FBI profiling studies.  Without a program in place to stop these individuals, organizations stand to lose an estimated $412,000 on average per incident.

In many organizations, a “we trust everyone to do the right thing” mindset too often prevails, and data points abound, such as 50% of employees who leave a company admitting to taking proprietary data,  to show why this is highly questionable logic.

Another issue is with internal rule benders who conclude that the added layer of protections are either unnecessary and/or overly alarmist and/or present too many inconveniences for them to deal with. They consider themselves and their work as above it all, and decide on their own as to when to follow security protocols – and when to circumvent them. As they grow more comfortable with the latter, they choose it as their “default” setting, doing things such as sending proprietary information outside the company “walls” without encryption, logging onto systems that they should not have access to, elevating other person’s access rights because security doesn’t understand the person’s real need, etc.  They love external drives and USB sticks, because these tools make it nearly impossible to distinguish risky behavior from harmless, work-related shortcuts. In fact according to a recent survey conducted by Voltage Security 50% of network users admitted to having bypassed security controls to complete a task more quickly and easily. Internal Rule Benders make up 15% of treat actors who have caused or committed a breach of their organizations’ data.  Senior executives are disinclined to acknowledge that the worst is, indeed, possible: “We trust the people we hire” and they perform a valuable role. We do not want to promote a culture of suspicion.  These Senior executives need to realize that Trust but Verify is a good mantra for them to start living by.

oopsIt’s too difficult. It’s too costly. There’s no imminent crisis. “Status quo”                                  is working out just fine. Then like, Target, Home Depot and many others they                      find out that it’s not, after it’s too late. 

On our team how can we implement items that allow us to do the following?

  • CERT’s “Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats” has emerged as an industry standard for program implementation. Among its recommended actions:
    • Launching a security information and event management (SIEM) system to log, monitor and audit user activity.
    • Detecting activities outside the users’ normal scope of duties via phone/network logs, etc.
    • Regularly reviewing accounts to verify that all are still active and necessary.
    • Ongoing auditing of user accounts created and passwords provided.
    • Requiring all system administrators to change passwords when a fellow administrator leaves his or her job.*
    • Monitoring and controlling remote access from all end points, including mobile devices.
    • Incorporating threat awareness/prevention policies into comprehensive termination policies.
    • Developing a baseline of “normal” network device behaviors.
    • Inventorying IT assets and routinely assessing their present-day role and relevancy.

Remember:

If you don’t go looking for trouble you will never find it.  

But, Trouble will find you / your Organization

How do we get back to this future in a technological workplace?

In the classic factory of the 1950s, managers strolled from their offices on a floor that towered over plant activity, closely observing whether shift crews below were doing what they were supposed to do. Because employees knew the eyes of a supervisor may be upon them at any time, they were less inclined to cheat the system – such as slipping any of the company’s property or product into their pockets, or sabotaging a machine out of spite. Thus, the business was protected. And what was good for the business was good for everyone involved: the bosses, the investors and, yes, the workers.  Said another way, it is good for business and for organizations to keep one rotten apple from spoiling the bunch.

factory

A day in the life of a senior Cyber Security Incident Responder

 

The day was proving to be an exciting one for team Havoc, the Company’s cyber Red Team, as the L2 report he had just read showed that 4 of the core company servers were vulnerable to a very common exploit.  Glacier, the Red Team leader, was evaluating the report and figuring out how he was going to communicate this to the Global IT leaders.  It was important to not just inform IT of the vulnerability, but to have recommended solution sets to present that were reasonable and that would allow them to be able to
remediate the vulnerabilities.  Glacier was on his second read through of the report whencyber hacker he noticed a section that mentioned end user data on the systems being encrypted.

“Hey Hammerhead come over here.” Hammerhead is the teams best Wintel expert. “What’s up?” “Take a look at these systems and check out what is happening with the data on the shared drive.  I’m thinking we’ve already been hacked and have a serious issue here.  What do you think?” “Oh man Glacier, it looks like we have an active ransomware attack, maybe using something like Cryptowall. ”

Glacier immediately contacts NightShade, the Cyber Incident Response Team (CIRT) coordinator and asks her to get the team assembled.

While the above scenario does happen more often than we would like it to, thankfully it is not an everyday occurrence.  Most days consist of conducting risk assessments on malware and zero-day events, investigating abnormal system behavior, and investigating employee or corporate security reports of suspicious activity. Each of these events has to be analyzed and assessed quickly, all the while knowing that each of the actions decided upon will be second guessed by arm chair quarterbacks across corporate IT leadership.  Let’s say the Incident Response (IR) team makes a decision to patch systems based on their initial intelligence gathering and risk analysis. If any of these systems have a production failure due to the patch, pushback from IT immediately begins and argument over the need and criticality of the patch ensues. Even when the actions taken, such as having corporate executives change their passwords, are less impactful to productivity than leaving a Second Guessingbuilding due to a fire alarm, second guessing by business leaders is inevitable. Even though the IR team’s decisions are rooted in cyber intelligence followed by an appropriate risk analysis, they are frequently told they are overreacting.

The business and IT leaders who do this second guessing often ask that in the future when these decisions are made they be made by group consensus.  This thinking shows a complete lack of understanding on how fast cyber-attacks can move.  For example:  When the blaster worm came out as a zero day event it took down Fortune 500 companies around the globe in less than 15 minutes. The other issue with this type of reasoning is that these business and IT resources, while highly intelligent, have limited knowledge of cyber security and what it takes to prevent or quickly remediate data breaches. This fact has been made obvious by the long line of large data breaches all in companies that had limited Cyber Security resources or that did not listen to the ones they did have.

The same business and IT leaders who are doing the second guessing of Cyber Security professionals most likely read the first paragraph of this paper with thoughts that it is silly and bizarre for Cyber Security IR teams to use nicknames.  Experienced IR professionals understand that hackers and fraudsters are highly intelligent and capable of conducting social engineering research to find the names of IR members so they can track those names on chats and systems in an effort to disrupt response capabilities.  In the past, law enforcement professionals have had the bad guys call police stations pretending to be a hospital where their wife or husband had just arrived after being in a car accident. it is very possible that cyber attackers would try some of the same tactics to disrupt IR response capabilities.  There are many IR teams that only have one UNIX or one Wintel resource and having them not engaged would cause a large negative impact to team operations.  So, not only should IR teams use nicknames but these nicknames should also be treated as restricted data.

So, after that interlude, let’s get back to a day in the life of a senior IR professional.   As with most jobs, coffee is the beginning of the day. While drinking their coffee, the IR professional reviews a variety of Cyber Intelligence sources to determine potential impact to the current employer.  On some days this leads into the intelligence gathering and risk analysis work discussed above, on other days it leads to a check through emails to make sure that the Level 1 (L1) or Level 2 (L2) Security Operations Center (SOC) did not have any urgent findings for immediate handling.  If there are no urgent needs in email, then a variety of L1 and L2 SOC reports are reviewed and analyzed and items of interest are followed up on as needed.  Being a student of Stephen Covey’s 7 habits and the Corporate Athlete methods, lunch is something lite and is followed by a walk or quick work out.  After lunch, the senior IR professional performs a quick check-in with each of the team members to see what items they are working on and to make sure that moral is high. This is followed by another quick email review to make sure nothing urgent has come in from Corporate Security, the company’s See Something – Say Something campaign, or either of the SOCs.   Assuming nothing needing attention has come in, the IR professional brings up the SIEM dashboard to conduct a Quality check of the work being done by the L1 and L2.  This often leads to some phone calls or a meeting with their team leaders to reinforce Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) items that are not being correctly followed.  The end of the day usually consists of going through all the emails that have had to sit while the daily tasks were completed.